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The Indirect Potential of Lafler and Frye
Wesley MacNeil Oliver*
There are a range of opinions about the potential impact of the
Supreme Court's latest opinions. My view of the potential of these
cases to create some meaningful limit on the presently unregulat-
ed world of plea bargaining is probably the most optimistic, or rad-
ical, of anyone who participated in this conference. Missouri v.
Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, in my view, hold the potential to im-
prove the quality of representation defendants receive in the nego-
tiation process and may lead judges to create a set of advisory
guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The direct
impact of these opinions is not, however, likely to be dramatic. It
is improbable that any large number of convictions will be over-
turned as a result of these decisions, just as few convictions are
reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal.
The indirect effects of these opinions could, however, fundamen-
tally change plea bargaining. Defense lawyers may come to value
their skills as negotiators just as they currently evaluate them-
selves on the basis of their trial and appellate abilities. And in
crafting remedies for violations of ineffective assistance of counsel
during the plea bargaining phase, judges will have an opportunity
to explain the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The impact of these decisions could therefore be enormous.
Contrary to the view of Professor Al Alschuler, the opinions
surely changed the legal landscape.' The Supreme Court's two
previous forays into this area recognized the right to the effective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining but did not recognize
the right to an effective negotiator. In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court
concluded that the defendant had not suffered prejudice because
the defendant had not contended that if counsel had performed
adequately he would have rejected a guilty plea, gone to trial, and
presumably had a reasonable chance of acquittal.' This prejudice
standard limited the Sixth Amendment obligation of defense
* Associate Professor and Director of the Criminal Justice Program at Duquesne
University School of law.
1. See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 678-81 (2013).
2. 474 U.S. 52. 60 (1985).
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counsel in the plea bargaining process to deciding whether a de-
fendant has a sufficiently good defense that he should exercise his
constitutional right to a trial. A defendant was not prejudiced,
under Hill, if his lawyer unreasonably failed to present facts, or
arguments, to a prosecutor that might have produced a more gen-
erous offer. Hill's prejudice standard is one that views plea offers
as prosecutorial largesse. Defense counsel's role, under Hill, was
limited to deciding whether his client would be better served by
rejecting this largesse and going to trial.
Padilla v. Kentucky strongly suggested that defense counsel had
a larger duty during the plea bargaining process, but did not ad-
dress the question of prejudice as it had not been considered by
the lower courts.3 In Padilla, a 40-year non-citizen resident of the
United States, who served his country with honor in the Vietnam
War, was charged with possession of 400 pounds of marijuana
with the intent to distribute.! His lawyer worked out a plea
agreement with the prosecutor, but Padilla, concerned about his
immigration status, asked his attorney if pleading guilty would
cause him to be deported. His attorney informed him that because
Padilla had been in the country so long, this would not be a con-
cern. This advice was entirely incorrect. The drug crimes to
which Padilla pled made him eligible for deportation.
The sole issue presented to the Supreme Court in Padilla's case
was whether his lawyer's performance in providing this incorrect
information amounted to performance below that of a reasonable
lawyer.' The lower courts had held that the deportation conse-
quences of a conviction were a collateral matter and defense coun-
sel was not required to make his client aware of such consequenc-
es of a conviction.' The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, finding
deportation to often be a greater punishment than those directly
imposed by the criminal justice system.' Interestingly, the Court
observed that had defense counsel been aware of the immigration
consequences of a conviction, he could have suggested a resolution
of the case that would have satisfied the prosecutor's interests and
not rendered Padilla subject to deportation.'
3. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
4. Id. at 1477.
5. Id. at 1478.
6. Id. at 1482.
7. Id. at 1481.
8. Id. at 1482.
9. Id. at 1483.
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To understand how differently the Court in Padilla viewed the
world, it is important to consider the facts of Hill v. Lockhart."0 In
Hill, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder and
theft. Under Arkansas law, first degree murder, at that time, was
punishable by a life sentence or, remarkably by modern standards,
5- to 50-years incarceration." The prosecution and defense coun-
sel agreed to a sentence of 35 years, to be served concurrently with
a 10-year sentence for the theft. 2 The prosecutor and defense
counsel both assumed that the defendant would be eligible for re-
lease after he served one-third of the sentence as neither realized
that the defendant had a prior felony.
The Court in Hill did not consider whether defense counsel had
performed inadequately in failing to learn about the prior felony.
Even if he had, under Hill's reasoning, the defendant would have
suffered no prejudice because defense counsel had not misappre-
hended the strength of the prosecution's case against him before
recommending a guilty plea. Hill's prejudice standard failed to
require defense counsel to engage in the most-frequently useful
type of advocacy performed at the plea bargaining stage-making
arguments for a more lenient sentence. If the prosecution in Hill
was satisfied with the defendant being eligible for release after
serving one-third of a 35-year sentence, it may have been satisfied
with him being eligible for release after serving one-half of a
somewhat lesser sentence. On the contrary, the prior felony may
have made the prosecution disinclined to grant further, or even
this much, leniency. But without knowing the actual consequenc-
es of his client's sentence, defense counsel in Hill was unable to
consider whether to approach the prosecution with a counter-offer.
Because counsel's lack of knowledge had nothing to do with as-
sessing the likelihood of acquittal at trial, however, the Court rea-
soned that there was no remedy, even if the failure to learn this
information was defense counsel's fault.
Padilla v. Kentucky therefore offered a very different perspec-
tive on the role of defense counsel. Counsel's misapprehension
about the immigration consequences of the plea said nothing
about counsel's understanding of the strength of the prosecution's
10. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
11. Id. at 53; see also ARKANSAS SENTENCING STANDARDS GRID § 16-90-803 (Arkansas
Sentencing Commission 2003), available at
http://www.arkansas.gov/asc/pdfs/2003benchbook.pdf (containing Arkansas' sentencing
guidelines for first-degree and capital murders).
12. Hill, 474 U.S. at 54.
Summer 2013 635
Duquesne Law Review
case. Had Padilla's lawyer known that his client's plea to a drug
offense made him eligible for deportation, however, it would have
radically changed the nature of the negotiation. Still, Padilla did
not recognize the Sixth Amendment right to an effective criminal
negotiator as its musings about how the knowledge of immigration
consequences would have changed the results in this case were
entirely dicta. The only issue before the Court was whether the
lower courts had correctly concluded that the performance of Pa-
dilla's counsel had been constitutionally deficient." The Court
concluded that it had been but remanded the case to the Kentucky
Supreme Court to determine whether Padilla had suffered preju-
dice.14
Lafler and Frye therefore, for the first time, gave the Court an
opportunity to change the Hill prejudice standard. In both of the-
se cases, the Court concluded that if defense counsel's failures
caused the defendant to reject a plea that he would have accepted,
that the prosecution would not have revoked, and that the trial
court would have entered, then his client has suffered prejudice."
In Frye, defense counsel failed to communicate the plea offer to his
client before the offer expired." In Lafler, defense counsel misad-
vised his client that as a matter of law he could not be convicted of
the most serious crimes he was facing." These errors-blatant
errors--occurred during the negotiation process. The defendants
in neither Lafler nor Frye were asserting that their lawyers im-
properly caused them to waive their right to a trial. In Lafler, the
defendant argued that his lawyer improperly caused him to exer-
cise it. In Frye, the Court held that defense counsel is required to
perform effectively in the process of negotiation and in Lafler, de-
fense counsel is required to consider whether waiving constitu-
tional rights is in his client's interest.
Padilla's dicta now becomes relevant. Now that errors in the
negotiation process can prejudice a defendant, defense counsel's
failure to learn information that might well change the nature of
the negotiation would seem to provide a basis for relief. Prosecu-
13. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1487.
14. Id. at 1487.
15. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409-11 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1390-91 (2012).
16. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411.
17. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
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torial discretion is practically boundless." Prosecutors can, and
do, consider all sorts of reasons for offering leniency in plea offers,
including the risk of acquittal, conservation of resources, coopera-
tion, and equitable considerations.1 9 The closest analog to the
range of consideration for prosecutors is the power of juries in cap-
ital cases to consider anything in mitigation; prosecutors can con-
sider even more than capital sentencing juries.2 0 Capital juries
can only look to anything about the defendant that makes a de-
fendant sympathetic-prosecutors can also consider their institu-
tional interests in obtaining cooperation or resolving cases without
a trial.2 1 In the capital context, the most frequent basis for a find-
ing of ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that mitigating
evidence was not discovered.2 2 Padilla's dicta suggests that de-
fendants will be able to bring just these sorts of claims.
While these decisions do change the legal landscape, many have
reasonably concluded that they are unlikely to produce a large
number of reversed convictions.2 3 Even in the capital sentencing
context, there are few convictions overturned for attorney error,
though there are more reversals in this context than in the guilt
phase of all trials-a somewhat remarkable statistic given the
comparatively small percentage of death penalty cases.24 The ac-
tual number of convictions reversed because of ineffective negotia-
tion may therefore be greater than commentators have anticipat-
ed, but the indirect impact of these cases on the criminal justice
system may well be considerably more substantial than the im-
pact felt from the reversal of convictions.
These decisions could improve the quality of negotiations by
criminal lawyers by changing what they consider to be their pri-
mary role to be in the criminal justice system. Ironically, criminal
18. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1128, 1144-46 (2011).
19. Id. at 1145.
20. See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Un-
guided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1156-61 (1991) (describing
ability of juries to consider any mitigating factor in capital sentencing).
21. Id. See generally Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996).
22. As an example, see Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms,
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 159 (2012); Bruce Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent
Counsel After Cooper and Frye: Is the Court Making the Ordinary Criminal Process "Too
Long, Too Expensive, and Unpredictable ... In Pursuit of Perfect Justice"?, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
735, 757 (2013).
24. See e.g., Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1645, 1656-61 (2008) (describing "heightened scrutiny of mitigation investigations").
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defense lawyers do not view themselves as negotiators, despite the
fact that 94 percent of all state criminal convictions and 97 per-
cent of all federal criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. A
quick look at the continuing legal education courses for defense
lawyers illustrates this point. At national and local conferences,
defense lawyers take courses on jury selection, cross-examination,
opening and closing statements, appellate advocacy and suppres-
sion of illegally obtained evidence. One is hard pressed to find a
CLE on plea bargaining. Compare this to civil lawyers. Just to
offer one example, the Harvard Program on Negotiation runs sem-
inars throughout the year teaching civil lawyers how to better ne-
gotiate.2 5 Civil lawyers see no distinction between negotiating a
favorable settlement and achieving a similar verdict after a jury
trial. Criminal lawyers certainly negotiate-the numbers don't
lie-but the negotiation is still very much underground in crimi-
nal bar circles.
A look at the way lawyers compare their abilities also demon-
strates the different views that criminal and civil lawyers have
toward negotiation. Civil lawyers make no distinction between
victories won in trial or settlements for their clients. The Million
Dollar Club lists attorneys who have obtained judgments for their
clients of a million dollars or more, regardless of whether they
were obtained through a trial or negotiation. By contrast, when
O.J. Simpson was charged with murder-and the State of Califor-
nia had an extraordinarily compelling case against him-his first
lead counsel, Robert Shapiro, was criticized for having experience
primarily as negotiating pleas for his clients. Despite the not
guilty verdict in that case, given the evidence, it seems that a law-
yer with excellent negotiation skills would have been an ideal
choice for O.J. Simpson, but this skill set of Mr. Shapiro's was of-
fered almost derisively by those commenting on the case.
The new prejudice standard, previewed in Padilla, may change
the way defense lawyers view their jobs. It may seem odd to sug-
gest that requiring defense counsel to meet a very low threshold of
effectiveness in negotiation will cause them to improve their skills.
The Strickland standard, after all, provides relief only when a
lawyer performs worse than any reasonable lawyer would have
performed in this situation-and grants extraordinary deference
25. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Program on Negotiation, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/
(last visited May 6, 2013).
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to an attorney's tactical decisions.26 And negotiation seems espe-
cially subject to judicial deference. As the Court observed in
Lafler, there are a number of styles of negotiation.2 7
The Supreme Court, however, has a unique bully pulpit to in-
fluence a lawyer's conduct, partially because of its visibility.
While a number of lower courts prior to Lafler and Frye had rec-
ognized that a defendant could suffer prejudice from a lawyer's
ineffective performance during the negotiation process, there were
few cases filed claiming attorney error during this phase." In the
year since these cases were decided, hundreds of reported decision
address these claims. If the threat of an ineffective assistance
claim has any effect on an attorney's attention to his client, then
the risk of a client filing a claim for ineffective assistance during
this phase went up exponentially after these cases.
The symbolic effect of these high profile opinions, however, is
likely to have a greater impact. Prior to the Supreme Court's
recognition in the 1970 case of Brady v. United States that a de-
fendant could legitimately enter a plea induced by a promise of
leniency, plea bargaining was frequently described as occurring
underground.2 9 While agreements after Brady were made more
openly, plea bargaining is still very much underground in the cul-
ture of the defense bar. Defense lawyers are a very collegial group
as a whole and readily share the tactics they have developed in
jury selection, cross examination, and opening and closing state-
ments. Discussions of the tactics of negotiation, and certainly the
results obtained from negotiation, have been taboo in defense law-
yer conferences, despite the fact that the entire criminal justice
system is driven by guilty pleas.o Some high-profile defense law-
yers even refuse to represent clients who are accepting guilty
pleas, particularly if those clients are cooperating with the gov-
ernment, though they typically hand their clients off to other
counsel to enter the plea they would not sully their reputations by
entering.31
26. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
27. Id. at 1391.
28. See e.g., David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L. J. 1532 (2011) (describing cases to consider
this issue).
29. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1044 (2006).
30. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, http://nacdl.org/meetings/ (last visited
April 17, 2013).
31. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, OHIO ST. L. J. 69, 111-26 (1995).
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The Supreme Court's assertion that defense counsel's Sixth
Amendment duty to his client includes effective negotiation has
the potential to change the culture of the defense bar as it under-
mines the caste of illegitimacy plea bargaining has had in the de-
fense bar culture. And if defense lawyers begin to talk openly
about the tactics of negotiation, and the substance of the deals
they are obtaining, the entire defense bar will be better equipped
to represent clients at this phase. Those who believe they are
uniquely able to obtain deals with prosecutors because of their
personal relationships may still be unwilling to participate in this
sharing of information, but there are plenty of reasons for defense
lawyers to relate the results they are obtaining. Pleas are entered
in open court, so defense counsel is hardly burning a bridge with a
prosecutor by adding a single publicly-announced data point. Fur-
ther, by participating in such information sharing, the defense
lawyer is able to obtain information about deals with prosecutors
other than those with whom he regularly deals. Such changes in
the culture of the defense bar, which Lafler and Frye may facili-
tate, will improve the quality of representation for defendants and
increase the transparency in the process.
The decisions also hold the potential to increase judicial over-
sight over both the charging and plea bargaining process. The
Court in Lafler v. Cooper left trial courts with extraordinary dis-
cretion to fashion a remedy when they find defense counsel per-
formed inadequately during the plea phase to his client's detri-
ment.3 2 Lower courts were instructed to use their equitable dis-
cretion to provide a remedy that does not grant a defendant a
windfall.33 In fashioning this remedy in cases like Lafler, courts
will seemingly have to look at why a reasonable prosecutor would
have made the offer that the defendant did not accept because of
counsel's failures. In reasoning toward the remedy they grant,
courts will essentially be providing guidelines for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
In Lafler, the Court concluded that a defendant was prejudiced
by his attorney's advice to go to trial based on legally incorrect
advice that he could not be convicted of assault with intent to
kill." The defendant went to trial, was convicted, and received a
sentence considerably greater than the one offered by the prosecu-
32. 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012).
33. Id. at 1388.
34. Id. at 1390.
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tor that was rejected because of the defense lawyer's egregiously
incorrect legal advice." The Supreme Court held that if a defend-
ant can show that but for his counsel's errors, he would have
agreed to take an offer, that the prosecutor would not have re-
voked the offer before it was accepted, and that the trial court
would have accepted it, then a habeas petition has made out a
successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.3 6 The Court
did not, however, say what the remedy should be. In fact, it re-
fused to announce either the appropriate remedy in Lafler, or a
test to determine the appropriate remedy. The Court left to the
lower courts the task of determining the appropriate remedy.
While the Court's guidance to lower courts was vague, it was not
non-existent. Lower courts were instructed that they were not to
grant defendants windfalls.37 This is consistent with the Court's
admonition in Strickland v. Washington and Lockhart v. Fretwell
that habeas petitioners' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are only entitled to outcomes that reflect fundamental fairness."
In Judge Easterbrook's introduction to this conference, he sug-
gested that granting a habeas petitioner any remedy once he has
rejected a plea and gone to trial provides a windfall." Starting
with Easterbrook's premise, this true. He suggests that prosecu-
tors only agree to grant leniency in the plea process when there is
some risk that they will lose if they go to trial.40 It is certainly
true that if the defendant has been convicted, it grants the de-
fendant a windfall to allow him to exchange a now-non-existent
risk of acquittal for leniency. But this is just another way of say-
ing that prosecutors are engaging in quid pro quo exchanges when
granting defendants leniency in exchange for the certainty of a
conviction. Quid pro quo exchanges are actually a windfall to the
defendant before, as well as after, the trial. Difficulties in proving
the prosecution's case have nothing to do with how a defendant
ought to be punished. It is mere happenstance there are complica-
tions in proving one particular defendant's case, but not in anoth-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1388.
37. Id.
38. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
696 (1984).





er. In the plea process, they will be offered very different deals for
reasons utterly unrelated to their culpability.
In some ways, Judge Easterbrook's concerns about windfalls are
even greater than he recognizes. Quid pro quo exchanges in plea
bargaining are not limited to offers motivated by a prosecutor's
concerns about losing a case. Prosecutors also offer leniency in the
plea bargaining process to conserve judicial and prosecutorial re-
sources, to allow victims to avoid the emotional toll of testifying,
and to obtain cooperation from defendants." As with a plea in
which the prosecution exchanges of a risk of acquittal for leniency,
a defendant does not obtain a lighter sentence because he is de-
serving of less punishment. When leniency is offered to obtain
cooperation, the opposite is in fact most often true. It is frequently
noted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which allow sub-
stantial reductions for cooperation, allow more culpable defend-
ants to obtain lighter sentences than less culpable ones.42 Drug
kingpins have more information than the mules they employ and
are ironically rewarded at sentencing for the amount of assistance
they were able to provide.
Whenever a defendant uses a possibility of acquittal, inconven-
ience to the prosecutor, or an offer of cooperation as a bargaining
chip, he is engaging in a quid pro quo exchange. Judge Easter-
brook is surely correct to conclude that a plea offer, lost because of
counsel's ineffectiveness, should not be restored in any manner,
when it was motivated by a quid pro quo exchange unrelated to a
defendant's culpability.
Not all plea bargains, however, are driven by quid pro quo ex-
changes. Prosecutors often make offers that are driven by their
sense that the offer represents an appropriate sentence.43 The
case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes is an excellent example of this
fact.' Paul Hayes was charged with forging and uttering a check
for $88.30. Under Kentucky law at the time, this was a felony
punishable by two to ten years at hard labor, but a judge would
have had the authority to grant probation for the entire term. Be-
41. Bibas, supra note 18, at 1141.
42. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 199, 212-213 (1993) (describing the "cooperation paradox"); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42
UCLA L. REV. 105, 138 (1994) (same).
43. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 54 (1968)
44. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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cause of Hayes' past and Kentucky's three-strikes law, Hayes was
eligible for a life sentence. The prosecutor offered Hayes a deal:
five years at hard labor, or he would seek to have his sentence en-
hanced under the three-strikes provision.45
As severe as five years sounds for forging and uttering a check
for $88.30,46 the prosecutor in Hayes' case appears to have been
driven by his sense that this was the equitably appropriate sen-
tence. It would have taken no time to try this case and there was
virtually no risk of an acquittal.47 There was a single witness to
the theft who was certain about the identification.4 8 Hayes was
not asked to cooperate in exchange for the deal and, as he acted
alone, cooperation would not have been a real possibility-at least
not for this particular crime. The check was taken from a conven-
ience store, so there would have been almost no emotional toll on
the witness to describe what he saw. The prosecutor appears to
have concluded that five years for this crime, combined with
Hayes' prior crimes of detaining a female (a lesser included offense
of rape) and armed robbery (for which he was on probation at the
time of the forgery and uttering) was an appropriate sentence.49
There are certainly design flaws in a system which allows a prose-
cutor to determine what he alone believes to be a just sentence
and obtain the defendant's agreement as to its fairness by threat-
ening a much graver consequence.o This is nevertheless the
American criminal justice system. In any given case, broad stat-
utes permit prosecutors to bring charges far in excess of anything
that they (or anyone) would regard to be a reasonable result."
45. Id. at 358.
46. Id. at 369 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("During the course of plea bargaining, the prose-
cutor offered respondent a sentence of five years in consideration of a guilty plea. I observe,
at this point, that five years in prison for the offense charged hardly could be characterized
as a generous offer.").
47. See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargaining and
the Decline of the Rule of Law, at 5 (November 2005). Harvard Public Law Working Paper
No. 120, available at SSRN: httpI/ssrn.com/abstract-854284 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.854284.
48. Id.
49. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Stuntz, supra
note 47, at 2.
50. As Al Alschuler beautifully describes it, when facing a gunman who says, "your
money or your life," the victim is taking the better possibility to surrender whatever cash in
his possession, but that does not make armed robbery somehow an appropriate act. See
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 686, 698.
51. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 598 (2001); see also HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: How THE FEDS
TARGET THE INNOCENT (2011).
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In some cases, as it seems to have been so in Bordenkircher,
prosecutors are motivated by equitable considerations to grant
leniency. In most cases, however, leniency in plea offers is likely
driven by a combination of quid pro quo and equitable considera-
tions." If lower courts are to carry out the Supreme Court's man-
date of granting a remedy to defendants without a windfall, they
will have to determine what amount of the offer that counsel's in-
effectiveness prevented the defendant from accepting, was at-
tributable to equitable considerations. This analysis will provide
courts an obligation-but more importantly, an opportunity-to
describe how reasonable prosecutors go about granting leniency in
light of various considerations.
These discussions will provide much needed guidance to the
most important, and most powerful actors in the criminal justice
system: prosecutors. Sentencing guidelines were developed at the
federal and state levels to even out inconsistencies between judg-
es." The potential for inconsistent treatment at the hands of a
sentencing judge, even before the guidelines, however, is dwarfed
by the potential for inconsistent treatment by prosecutors. Sen-
tencing hearings have always occurred in public, on the record,
and been subject to some sort of appellate review. Judges have
long felt an obligation to explain the reasons for their sentences
both to the defendant standing before them and to the public at
large. There is no mechanism for even determining the rationale
for prosecutorial charging decisions and plea offers. Some prose-
cutors, like some judges, are more lenient than others. As the rea-
soning of prosecutors is never disclosed, there is no opportunity to
even consider the validity of their decisions or the consistency in
their exercise of judgment. Whatever inconsistency exists, be it
driven by legitimate difference in philosophy, or illegitimate con-
siderations such as the relationship between the defense lawyer
and prosecutor, is very difficult to discover when the prosecutors
have to explain nothing about their decisions.
Judges have long avoided second-guessing prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions-and by extension the appropriateness of the
amount of leniency offered in a plea-because of separation of
powers considerations.5 In crafting remedies for situations like
52. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 55
(1968).
53. Lee, supra note 42, at 115-16.
54. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Inmates of Attica Correction-
al Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
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the one before the Court in Lafler, the Court will thus be identify-
ing the type of considerations a reasonable prosecutor would take
into account in making charging and bargaining decisions." Fi-
delity to the Supreme Court's opinion will not necessarily require
lower courts to identify the portions of the plea attributable to
each of the possible quid pro quo exchanges that could have ani-
mated the plea offer. Lower courts will merely be required to
make an assessment of the extent of the leniency attributable to
equitable consideration, as opposed to the portion of the plea at-
tributable solely to a quid pro quo exchange.
Evaluating how a prosecutor should have viewed the equities in
a particular case, however, will start a conversation about the ap-
propriate use of prosecutorial discretion. This is not say that
judges-or certainly any one judge considering a habeas petition-
will have a lock on the appropriate use of prosecutorial power.
Decisions offering a judge's view of how a reasonable prosecutor
would have viewed the facts of a particular case, however, begin a
conversation about the exercise of this power. Prosecutors, and
judges reviewing subsequent habeas petitions, are certainly capa-
ble of disagreeing with any one judge's assessment of how a rea-
sonable prosecutor would have, or should have, accounted for the
particular attributes of a case. This, however, is the genius of the
common law. It is a forum for discussion and even public com-
ment.
The vaguely articulated remedy in Lafler appears to require and
enable lower courts to make the appropriate exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion a matter of public consideration. Certainly, prose-
cutors would not be bound by judicial considerations, but these
considerations would provide a starting point from which prosecu-
tors would feel pressure to justify departures.
Lafler and Frye recognized the reality that modern criminal
practice is the negotiation process and encouraged the develop-
ment of a better process of plea bargaining in a way that did not
intrude on the long-recognized prosecutorial prerogative. The cas-
55. In cases like Padilla, this sort of remedy is, of course, not possible. In Padilla,
defense counsel's lack of knowledge prevented an informed negotiation that could have
produced a better outcome for the defendant. There was no lost opportunity as there was
in Lafler v. Frye. For Padilla-type errors, the remedy David Perez has suggested as the
appropriate remedy for all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining
appears to be the only possible remedy: forcing the parties to bargain with the court. David
A. Perez, Attorney at Perkins Coie, Structuring Remedies in the Wake of Lafler and Frye,
Presentation at the Duquesne University School of Law Plea Bargaining After Lafler and
Frye Symposium (March 1, 2013).
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es therefore create circumstances permitting the development of
an advisory common law of plea bargaining and motivate defense
counsel to perfect their skills in this forum, just as they have long
honed their talents in the traditional adversarial forums. Lafler
and Frye thus may indeed be viewed as landmark decisions
through the lens of history for their indirect impact on the crimi-
nal justice system.
